the model of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank. Among the nonmonetarists are Waiter Heller, Gardner Ackley, Arthur Okun, James Tobin, and the large econometric models such as the Wharton model and the FRB-MIT model. Sometimes the distinction between the two groups has been summarized in the allegation that a monetarist is one who not only believes that money matters, but also believes that money is the only thing which matters, 1
iT. CASUAL reading of the popular discussion of stabilization pohey over the past four or five years would suggest that the definition of a monetarist was firmly established. In the monetarist camp are Milton Friedman, Karl Brunner, Allan Meltzer, and the model of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank. Among the nonmonetarists are Waiter Heller, Gardner Ackley, Arthur Okun, James Tobin, and the large econometric models such as the Wharton model and the FRB-MIT model. Sometimes the distinction between the two groups has been summarized in the allegation that a monetarist is one who not only believes that money matters, but also believes that money is the only thing which matters, 1
A close reading of the writings of those associated with both points of view, suggests that distinctions are not completely clear at the level of monetary theory. Leonall C. Andersen has characterized the monetarist position on stabilization pohcy as holding that "the major impact of monetary actions is ... on longrun movements in nominal economic variables such as nominal GNP, the general price level, and market interest rates. Ibid., p. 4.
The question is what theoretical framework can produce these types of conclusions, and can it be tested? Again quoting the Andersen paper, "monetary actions . . . are considered a disturbance which infhjenees the acquisition of financial and real assets. Rates of rethrn on real and financial assets and market prices adjust to create a new equilibrium position of the economy; therefore these changes are considered the main channels of monetary influence on aggregate demand." 4
Thus the monetarist conception of what has been called the transmission mechanism is one of monetary disturbances which change interest rates and the relative prices of real and financial assets. Such changes induce a reallocation of asset portfolios which can include changes in the demand for real assets. Finally, the portfolio adjustments and relative price changes can change the demand for consumables. In an earlier article in this Review, Karl Brunner characterizes a similar position as the "weak monetarist thesis." 5
This construct of the world is apparently one which is widely accepted among monetary economists today and thus does not discriminate among the monetarist and nonmonetarist positions. Certainly a whole succession of writings by James Tobin suggests an explanation quite consistent with this view of the transm ission mechanism of monetary po1icy.~In fact, Andersen admits that he would view his mechanism as "close to the Tobin view, except that it takes into ctonsicleration many more rates of return and market prices of goods and services."
7 An examination of thẽ writings of other nonmonetarist economists will show similar consistencies with this view of the transmission mnechanism. Therefore "~veakmonetarism," as a theoretical position, does not appear to be a monopoly of the monetarists.
Given this apparent agreement on the theoretical basis of the mechanism through which monetary policy actions affect the economy, one can question whether the "monetarist counterrevolution" is more than an attempt at product differentiation, such as economists usually associate with monopolistic compelition. A pragmatic view of the discussion suggests that at least four substantive issues are invoIved~(1) the usefulness of the IS-LM aggregate demand framework for policy formulation; (2) the dynamic adjustment of the economy to a new equilibrium aftei-a policy shock; (3) the mode of conduct of monetary policy; and (4) an econometric issue of large versus small models.
Limitations of Policy Prescriptions from the IS~LMFramework
A major source of monetarist criticism has been the use of the IS-LM framework for aggregative policy analysis. In this Review, Ronald Teigen has attempted to defend the IS~LMframework from one monetarist accusation that this framework holds that an increase in the stock of money lowers the interest rate and raises output.
8 He demonstrates that with certain assumptions about the relative speeds of adjustment of various markets, it is possible to show that interest rates over time~vi1Ifirst fall and then rise again as the system returns to a new equilibrium.
At the same time Teigen admits that this framework has ignored price expectations, and in addition, that it is not easy to incorporate price expectations, a dynamic phenomenon, into the static frarnewoi-k. This appears to sidestep the crux of the monetarist complaints. Not only does the conventional IS-LM analysis ignore price expectations, but it usually ignores effects from changes in the level of prices. The omission of such price level effects is possible only when the macroeconomic model 5s specified totally in terms of real flow variables. In sophisticated analysis. such as that of Martin Bailey, price level effec~of various kinds arc introduced, and it can be shown that the position of either the IS or the LM curve (in the interest rate -real income plane) is dependent upon the current price level, 9
Most macro-economists will acknowle4ge the validity of the price level effect on the LM curve arising from the specification of the demand for money as a demand for real balances. Similarly, a specification of the consumption function in terms of income and wealth as implied by a permanent income or "lifecycle" hypothesis will generate a family of IS curves, one for each level of real wealth 1°O nce both are constructed as functions of the price level, any policy action which generates a change in the price level will not o~1yhave a direct impact on the IS (fiscal policy) or the LM (monetary policy) etirve, but also will cause additional shifts in both curves through the changes in the price level, Under these circumstances, simple multiplier calculations do not adequately represent the reaction of the economy to the policy ac6on. Accurate policy conclusions cannot be derived without estimates of the parameters of the system.
The situation is further complicated when it is assumed that monetary policy can affect the market value of assets, such as corporate equities, through induced changes in the rate of return on these assets, Then the specification of a consumption-wealth re1at ionship implies that any change in interest rates will induce a shIft in the IS curve.
Teigen has already indicated that it is difficult, if not impossible, to incorporate dynamic phenomenon such as price expectaUons into the static framework of this construct,tt Yet, as the monetarists have rightly pointed out, adjustments in specified behavioral relationships have to be made for such expectations under conditions of anticipated inflation (and particularly when the rate of inflation is anticipated to be changing).
It appears that the monetarists have justifiable complaints with the policy analysis derived from this framework, which is common to popular macroeconomic textbooks and past annual reports of the Council of Economic Advisers, even if one is prepared to accept the proposition that there are no deep theoretical differences in the transmission mechanism for monetary mid fiscal policy.
In many respects the monetarist attack on the IS-LM framework is fighling a "straw man." Many of the limitations of this highly aggregative framework, such as those indicated above, have been attacked iñ 0 It is not I~ecessaryto assume this kind of consumption ftrnchon to generate such a family of curves. Price elasticities of imports and exports with respect to domestic and foreign prices, or income tax functions which have nominal income elasticity greater than one, will generate the same effect. "Teigeri. "A Critical Look," p. 19. larger econometric models of income determination. This is not to say that these models have captured the various effects with a high degree of precision. In particular, the econometric problem of estimating distributed lags has proven particularly difficult, thus the timing of responses to policy actions as implied by large statistical models is a major area of uncertainty at the present time.
The Process of Adjustment to Policy Actions
A close reading of the monetarist evaluation of the relative strengths of monetary and fiscal policy leaves the impression that they are not quite talking about the same thing as the nonmonetarists. This can be illustrated by the first quote from Andersen, above, which sets out the transmission of monetary policy on the economy as the adjustment of rates of return and prices to a new equilibrium (in the absence of further exogenous shocks). A similar characterization has been made in a recent analysis by Friedman in which he distinguishes 'Keynesian" analysis as a framework in which prices are assumed exogenously constant.
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Most empirical models of income determination today regard the price ]evel as endogenously determined, with the independent variables in the price level equation specified as money wage rates and productivity separately or in a composite form as unit labor costs.
1~I n addition, money wage rates are usually assumed to be endogenous variables in such models. The behavior of wage rates in such models is usually specified to follow a modified version of the "Phillips Curve," 4 This specification is a disequilibrium mechanism which holds that, in the presence of an excess demand or supply in the labor market (usil- ally measured by the unemployment rate), money wage rates will change. However, it says nothing about the nature of the equilibrium toward which the market is presumab'y adjusting. This is a modification of the early post-Keynesian models in which the money wage rate was taken theoretically, if not empirically, as fixed in the short run. It seems appropriate to conclude that the rnonetarists and their opponents are discussing policy effects on the economy over two different time spans. The nonmonetarists have implicitly concerned themselves with models in which the labor market, at least, remained in disequilibrium. The monetarists on the other hand, in discussing policy impacts when the new equilibrium position of the economy" has been achieved, implicitly appear to be concerned with the period of time in which all markets, including the labor market, have adjusted themselves to the policy shock. The recent reinterpretation of the General Theory by Leijonhufvud offers an explanatioll of this debate in terms of the dynamics of the labor market. He argues:
The revolutionary impact of Keynesian Economies on contemporary thought stemmed in the rnaiu, we have argued, from Keynes' reversal of the couventional rai~kingof price and quantity velocities. iii the Keynesian models price vdocities are not infinite; it is sometimes said that the impli ahons of the model result from the assumption that mofle'-wages are "rigid". This usage can he misleading. Income-constrained proceses result not only when price-level velocity is zero, but whenez~erit IS short of infinite.1 5
He further argues that this is an appropriate assumption if there are substantial information costs associated with trading in the labor market, as recent theories of labor market behavior have poswlated: 1ĩ n the absence of perfect k-nowleclge m the part of transacting nits )r of anv mechanism iin related to the 1,-ailing process itself that woidd supply the needed inforrnati)ri co,itlesslq. the presumption of infinite price v&oc:itv disappears.
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Unfortullately, little attention has been given to empirical investigation of the process by which labor markets adjust to equilibrium. This adjustment process has significant implications for the reaction of all economic system to pure fiscal policy changes such as increased government expenditures on goods and services and increased real disposable income of consumers through tax reductions unaccomparned by increases in the money stock.
Acceptance of the Kev~esian concepts of a consumption function and an interest dasticity of the demand for real cash balances, does not imply increases in output and employment from the above types of fiscal policy actions if the labor market is allowed to adjust to the equilibrium si~pp1yand demand functions which prevailed before the policy shock.' 8 The restoration of such an equilibrium implies the same real output and employment which prevailed before the policy action, that is complete crowding out" of the fiscal stimulus in real terms. \Vhich elements of real private demand are displaced by the fiscal stimulus~vi1I depend on the specifications of the sector demand functions.
If the money demand function is completely interest inelastic then, when the new equilibrium is achieved, velocity must be unchanged in the absence of an accommodating monetary expansion, and complete "crowding out" must also occur in nominal terms. With an interest elastic money demand function, higher prices can occur in the new equilibrium as a result of higher nominal interest rates. In this case complete "crowding out"~viIlnot occur in nominal terms.
The results of this model are consistent with the nionetanst position on the role of fiscal policy as outl ined by Andersen and others. Therefore, if the adjustment process in the labor market is relatively rapid, then the weight would seem to be with the monetarist contention that fiscal policy is a relatively weak tool for short-run stabilization. On the other hand, if the adjustment is very slow, "transitory impacts" of fiscal policy actions of the type usually dcrived from income determination models exist, and way have an important role in stabilization policy."
The Conduct of Monetary Policy
A consistent characteristic of the monetarist position is the insistence that monetary policy should be conducted in terms of controlling the rate of growth of monetary aggregates rather than controlling interest rates or money market conditions. This positioñ an be traced hack at least as far as early post-war proposa's of Friedman during the period when the Federal Reserve was still supporting the price of Government debt. 2°I
n support of this position, the monetarists have developed a number of valid objections to the money market approach. First, they would hold that the view ' that monetary influences are channeled to aggregate demand only through impacts of interest rates on inṽ estment demand is too narrow a view of the role of monetary policy. It has been argued above that there exists fairly widespread support for this argument toclay, at least as a theoretical position. Second, they would argue that observed market rates of interest are nominal rates, and that in times of changing expectations of future inflation rates, the relevant interest rates for economic dcci ionmaking are ex-ante real rates of interest -nominal rates less the anticipated rate of future inflation. Under these circumstances it is possible that changes in nominal interest rates may give a completely wrong impression of what is really happening in terms of real rates of return.
As an example of this, the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank has published from time to time over the past several years, estimates of a real interest rate series which proposes to measure long-term yield such as the corporate bond rate adjusted for inflationary anticipations. The contrast in the behavior of this series and the corresponding nominal series is quite striking. It is well known that the nominal series has achieved historically high levels in the past several years. On the other hand, the proxy for the real rate has remained remarkably steady over the latter part of the decade. One can object, of course, to the techniques used to approximate this series. Nevertheless, the monetarists have made a valuable contribution in emphasizing this distinction, because the existence of "inflation premiums" in market interest rates, particularly long-term rates, over the past several years is now widely acknowledged.
2 '
An additional argument which has not been advanced by the monetarists to my knowledge, can be derived from recent work in investment theory. Considerable empiric~iltesting has now been done on the neoclassical theory of investment which is most closely associated with the work of Jorgenson.
22 This theory indicates that interest rates are but one component of the quasi rent on new capital, which is a postu- lated determinant of investment activity. Various tax policy actions can also affect the rate of return on capital, and it is the net effect of the changes in interest rates and these tax policy actions which is the relevant influence on investment behavior. In pai-ticular, in discussions of monetary policy in late 1971, arguments that interest rates must be brought down to stimulate investment may be overly emotional. With the resumption of permanent tax credits on equipment, and the reduction of useful lives allowed for tax purposes earlier in the year thrrnigh the revision of Treasury regulations, it is likely that the net effect on investment demand through the so called "cost of capital" channel would be expansionary, even if interest rates were to rise significantly over the first part of next year.
If these arguments are valid in minimizing the imp ortance of money market conditions as the target of monetary policy, then the question which remains to be answered is why concentrate on the rate of growth of monetary aggregates. It would seem that there is nothing in the "weak monetarist thesis," as outlined above, which is sufficient to call for the conduct of monetary policy in terms of controlling the rate of growth of monetary aggregates. The theory must be supplemented by additional hypotheses about the short-run behavior of velocity.
Brunner establishes a necessary condition for this policy orientation in what he calls the "strong monet arist thesis," which maintains that the variability of monetary impulses is also large relative to the speed at which the economy absorbs the impact of environmental changes.
2~I t does not seem totally appropriate to interpret this statement as holding that velocity is (or must be) constant in the short run, as some recent commentators seem to imply. 24 All that appears necessary is that if velocity changes, it mast change in a manner which is predictable from the time path of past or predicted future behavior of the money supply. It can be demonstrated with currently popular formulations of the money demand function that the lower the short-run interest elasticity of the demand for money, the more likely this condition will be met. We shall return to this point in the next section where some comments are presented on the St. Louis equation.
Several remarks on the current state of empirical research on the money demand function are appro- priate at this point.
2~I t appears inappropriate to argue about the stability of the demand for money function, in the sense that the aggregate demand for real cash balances can be thought of as a stable function of a few pararneters. 2~T his proposition has been implicitly accepted by all empirical research into the nature of this function. 27 It is also true that most of these studies have concluded that statistically significant interest elasticifies of money demand do exist, On the other hand the studies which have attempted to distinguish between short-run and long-run interest elasticities have consistently found that the shothrun elasticities are quite small relative to the long-run elasticities because of a relatively slow speed of adjustment back to the long-run function after a disturbance from an initial portfolio equilibrium position.
It should be noted that these propositions say nothing about the control of the money stock through open market operations aimed at money market conditicrns versus control through open market operations aimed at reserve aggregate targets. This iss~ieinvolves the elasticity of the supply function for money, rather than the demand function, and goes beyond the scope of the present discussion.
The St. Louis Equation
The discussion up to this point has centered on monetarism as monetary theory and its prescriptions for monetary policy. It seems appropriate to conclude with some remarks on the St. Louis equation.
This regression has been the subject of varied interpretation since it first appeared. In their original arti- n the latter article, it was also noted that equations had been constructed using percentage ch&wgcs, rather than first differences, and that the results were basically unaffected by the change in specification.
These equations and their established forecasting properties have remained somewhat a mystery to uconomists associated with the nonmonetarist position and the tradition of large econometric models. It has been subjected to numerous attacks Ofl the choice of independent variables and problems of statistical bias.
3°I n general it would appear that the equation has withstood these attacks surprisingly (or disturbingly) well.
We shall offer yet another interpretation of the St. Louis eqintion which suggests that it is not a "reduced form" of an unspecified system, but rather only one component of the structural system. This interpretation of the St. Louis results is not sympathetic to the view that the St. Louis equations are a competitive econometric' model of the United States economy. Judged in this perspective, it is possible to rationalize its forecasting performance, + X~3ÃlnM-j + I
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Recent empirical formulations of the demand for money function specify that in the long run velocity is a function of interest rates, aild assume that private economic units adjust to their long-run equilibrium cash balances with a lag. Such models can be transformed into a specification :31 (3) MnV = y~ala g(r) + yj AIuM~+ !~i A1nMt-w here r = interest rate.
If for the moment the interest rate term is ignored, this equation appears quite similar to the transformed Andersen-Jordan equation (I) above. It can be clearly seen from this equation that such specifications of the money demand ftincion relate changes in velocity to current and lagged changes in the money stock ( all in logarithms), It further suggests that changes in interest rates will induce additional changes ill velocity.
Most economists would hold that changes in interest rates and money stock are jointly determined, and consequendy, forecasts from equation (1), ignoring the induced changes on interest rates from changes in the money stock, will cause forecasting errors. However, if the short-run üflercst dasticity of the money demand function is very small, then~w estimated equation omitting this term would most likely produce a credible forecasting record. In addition, it is likely that the distributed lag on high-employment Government expenditures used by Andersen and Jordan is correlated with interest rates in both the sample and post sample periods, and serves as an effective proxy variable for forecasting purposes. 32
Summary
Monetansm and the monetarist approach to demand management has raised many issues in the past several years which have significantly influenced the attitudes of professional economists on the question of i=1
Recognizing that percentage mately equal to changes in changes, the St. Louis equation changes are approxilogarithms for small can be rewritten as:
3~S eeAppendix for the derivation.
32 Equatioos of the form of ( 3 ) have been estimated using the data of the current St. Louis forecasting equations, both with and without the high-employment expenditure variables. Space constraints permit only the comment that the interest rate variable, either a short-term rate such as the Treasury bill rate, or a long-terni rate such as the Corporate Aaa rate, show up as high'y significant variables, thongh with von low short-run elasticities, Even with the interest rate variable in the specification, some of the coefficients in the distributed lag on high-employment exp enditures remain significant.
